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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in biotechnology have given researchers the ability to comprehensively examine the
genetic basis of disease in unprecedented ways and will undoubtedly result in many new and valuable
gene based diagnostic assays in the near future. These advances came during a period of roughly
thirty years during which the patent eligibility of such assays was essentially unquestioned. Then,
beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court embarked on a series of decisions that will, in almost all cases,
preclude the patenting of diagnostic assays that rely on genetic mutations or gene expression patterns.
This article suggests that reason that the issue of patent eligibility went unquestioned in the
biotechnology industry for so long is due to early Supreme Court decisions that took conflicting
approaches to analyzing patent eligibility. It also examines why the patent eligibility test that has
now been adopted by the Supreme Court is so devastating to the patenting of gene based assays.
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THE PATENTING OF GENE BASED DIAGNOSTIC ASSAYS IN A POST MAYO
AND MYRIAD WORLD
MICHAEL A. SANZO*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 14, 2003, the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium
announced that it had completed sequencing the approximately 3 billion nucleotides
making up the human genome. The project had taken about 10 years, involved over
200 researchers and had cost about 3 billion dollars. 1 By 2014, the time needed for the
complete sequencing of a genome had been reduced to 50 hours, at a cost of $6,500 and
there are currently procedures available that can purportedly obtain a complete
sequence in 26 hours at $1,000 $1,500 per person. 2 For the first time, scientists are
able to comprehensively compare the genomes of diseased and normal individuals and,
as a result, gene based diagnostic methods are poised to enter an unparalleled period
of discovery.
This remarkable advancement has occurred during a 30-year period in which
court decisions established, and then repeatedly confirmed, the patentability of genes
and gene based diagnostic methods. Then, in a rapid series of cases beginning in 2010,
isolated genes were declared unpatentable products of nature and criteria were
established that essentially ensure that nearly all gene based diagnostic tests will be
found to be patent ineligible. As a result of these cases, thousands of patent claims
have been invalidated and companies operating in the diagnostic field have struggled
to develop new strategies for protecting intellectual property.
This paper will examine exactly where we are now with respect to the patenting
of genes and gene based diagnostic methods and how an entire industry got things so
wrong for so many years.

* © Michael A. Sanzo 2016. Ph.D., J.D., and is a patent attorney working in the areas of
chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization with which he is associated.
1 Gina Kolata, Human Genome, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013, at D3; International
Consortium Completes Human Genome Project, All Goals Achieved; New Vision for Genome Research
Unveiled, National Human Genome Research Inst., https://www.genome.gov/11006929/2003-releaseinternational-consortium-completes-hgp/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2016); Erika Hayden, Technology: The
$1,000 genome, 507 Nature 294-295 (March 2014).
2 Neil A. Miller et al., A 26-hour system of highly sensitive whole genome sequencing for emergency
management of genetic diseases, 7 GENOME MEDICINE 100 (2015); Claire Maldarelli, We Can Now
Sequence A Whole Human Genome In 26 Hours, Popular Science (Sept. 30, 2015),
http://www.popsci.com/scientists-can-now-sequence-whole-genome-in-26-hours; ; Michele Munz, New
Genome Technology Opens Door to Large-Scale Disease Studies, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, May 5,
2015.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, there are four major Supreme Court cases that are usually
recognized as being of particular importance with respect to patent eligibility: Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,3 Parker v. Flook,4 Diamond v. Chakrabarty,5 and
Diamond v. Diehr.6 These cases all agree with the basic premise that a law of nature,
an abstract principle or a product of nature are not themselves patent eligible but may
sometimes become patent eligible if they are part of a broader claim. Where the cases
differ is in the way that they analyze claims and reach conclusions regarding eligibility.
Two of the cases, Funk Bros. and Flook, analyze patent eligibility by claim
dissection. In this form of analysis, each individual element in a claim is separately
reviewed to determine whether it would be considered patent ineligible if claimed
alone. If such subject matter is present, then the other claim elements are examined
to determine whether they are inventive when considered in the absence of the
patent ineligible elements. Concepts of patentability and patent eligibility tend to be
mixed together in these cases in a way that, as we shall see, will almost inevitably lead
to a conclusion that a gene based diagnostic method is patent ineligible.
In contrast, the Chakrabarty and Diehr cases begin analysis by asking whether a
claim as a whole is directed to a law of nature7 or is limited to a particular application
of the law. Claim elements are not separated from one another; concepts of patent
eligibility and patentability are kept distinct and contributions of laws of nature to
inventiveness are considered. For the purposes of the present discussion, this
approach will be referred to as whole claim analysis. Although these decisions have
been characterized as following Funk Bros. and Flook, the cases are, in fact, essentially
incompatible with one another and produce diametrically opposed results.
The sections that follow examine how the different approaches taken by the
Supreme Court have contributed to the crisis that now exists with respect to the
patentability of gene based diagnostic methods.

A. Analysis by Claim Dissection (Funk Bros. and Flook)
Probably the best starting point in discussing patent eligibility is with Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.8 This decision occurred in 1948, four years prior to the
1952 revisions in patent law, and at a time when courts often mixed together different
criteria of patentability.9 At issue was the validity of claims to an inoculant
composition made up of distinct strains of bacteria, each with the ability to infect a
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
5 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
6 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7 Natural processes may be regarded as laws of nature and genes as products of nature. For the
purposes of the present analysis, all patent ineligible subject matter is considered as a whole. It will
be understood that, unless otherwise indicated, reference to one form of patent ineligible subject
matter includes the other forms as well.
8 333 U.S. at 127.
9 See id.
3
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single type of leguminous plant and serve as a source of nitrogen. Apart from the
bacteria having been selected so as to not interfere with one another s ability to carry
out this function, they were unchanged from their state in nature.
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in this case exemplifies the claim
dissection approach and can be seen in the following comments by the Court:
Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in the package infects
the same group of leguminous plants which it always infected. No species
acquires a different use. The combination of species produces no new
bacteria, no change in the six species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the
range of their utility. Each species has the same effect it always had. The
bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in combination does not
improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the ends nature
originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the patentee. 10
The Court does not simply ask whether the claimed inoculum is found in nature,
but instead begins by considering each element of the inoculum, i.e., each strain of
bacteria, and asking whether it is acting in a new and distinct way. The focus is on
whether the composition changes the activity of each bacterial strain and not on
whether the composition itself is performing in a different way than compositions
found in nature. In this regard, it is worth noting that the patent did not claim
individual bacterial strains and that the Court never suggests that the claimed
combination exists in nature.
The opinion then continues with, what today, would most closely resemble an
analysis of the novelty and nonobviousness of the inoculum:
Even though it [the inoculum] may have been the product of skill, it certainly
was not the product of invention. There is no way in which we could call it
such unless we borrowed invention from the discovery of the natural principle
itself. That is to say, there is no invention here unless the discovery that
certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and
may thus be safely mixed is invention. But we cannot so hold without
allowing a patent to issue on one of the ancient secrets of nature now
disclosed. All that remains, therefore, are advantages of the mixed
inoculants themselves. They are not enough.11
The prohibition on borrowing invention from a law of nature is an important
characteristic of cases following the Funk Bros. model.12 In this view, once subject
matter is deemed to be a law or product of nature, it cannot itself make a contribution
to the novelty and nonobviousness (or invention ) of a claim. The effect of this on
claims to gene based diagnostic assays is devastating. The inventiveness of these
See id. at 131.
See id. at 132.
12 The meaning of the term invention in pre and post 1952 cases is discussed by Judge Rich in
In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (1979). As used in the Funk Bros. case, the term appears to be closer
to patentability than nonobviousness in today s parlance.
10
11
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assays is usually based on a discovery of a relationship between mutations or gene
expression patterns and disease and these relationships are considered to be laws of
nature. Eliminating their contribution to invention goes to the very heart of claims
to these assays.
Finally, it is important to recognize the way in which this case mixes different
aspects of patent law to produce a muddled result in which neither patentability nor
patent eligibility is clearly addressed. Justice Douglas seems to find the claimed
composition to be unpatentable because all of the bacterial components that make it
up are products of nature and the products of nature to be patent ineligible because
the claim is unpatentable.
A second case that has served prominently as a precedent in patent eligibility
cases is Parker v. Flook,13 a decision in which the Supreme Court considered the patent
eligibility of claims to a method for determining an alarm limit. In the context of the
case, alarm limits are values used during chemical reactions to signal that a parameter
such as temperature or pressure is exceeding a point where the reaction can proceed
in a safe an efficient manner. The claimed method consisted of: (a) monitoring the
parameter of interest, e.g., temperature; (b) using an algorithm to calculate an alarm
limit based on changes in the parameter; and (c) setting the alarm limit based on the
calculation. The only thing distinguishing the invention from prior art procedures was
the use of the algorithm.
Even though Flook was decided in 1978, long after the 1952 revisions to patent
law had clarified and separated different aspects of patentability, it took the same
approach to analyzing patent eligibility as used in the Funk Bros. case. Concepts of
patent eligibility and patentability are mixed together and contributions of the
purported law of nature (or in this case, the algorithm) are excluded from
consideration. This is illustrated in the decision as follows:
Mackay Radio and Funk Bros. point to the proper analysis for this case: The
process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and
useful. Indeed, the novelty of the mathematical algorithm is not a
determining factor at all. Whether the algorithm was in fact known or
unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as one of the basic tools of
scientific and technological work, it is treated as though it were a familiar
part of the prior art.14
The idea that laws of nature should be considered to be part of the prior art in
analyzing claims in the U.S. appears to have its origin in the 1853 case of O Reilly v.
Morse15 and this is the source cited in Flook.16 The most relevant portion of Morse with
respect to patent ineligibility involves the Court s review of the English case Neilson v
Harford,17 which concerned the discovery by Nielson that the functioning of a blast
furnace could be improved if air was heated before being passed through molten metal
in the furnace. A primary issue was whether the claims encompassed anything more
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
See id. at 591-592.
15 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
16 437 U.S. at 592.
17 151 ER 1266 (1841); summarized at: www.bustpatents.com/CASELAW/NEILSON.html.
13
14
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than the principle (for our purposes law of nature ) that hot air promotes ignition
better than cold air. Commenting on this issue, the Morse court stated:
But after much consideration it was finally decided that this principle must
be regarded as well known, and that the plaintiff had invented a mechanical
mode of applying it to furnaces, and that his invention consisted in
interposing a heated receptacle between the blower and the furnace, and by
this means heating the air after it left the blower and before it was thrown
into the fire.
Undoubtedly the principle that hot air will promote the ignition of fuel better
than cold was embodied in this machine. But the patent was not supported
because this principle was embodied in it. He would have been equally
entitled to a patent if he had invented an improvement in the mechanical
arrangements of the blowing apparatus or in the furnace while a cold current
of air was still used. But his patent was supported because he had invented
a mechanical apparatus by which a current of hot air, instead of cold, could
be thrown in. And this new method was protected by his patent. The
interposition of a heated receptacle in any form was the novelty he invented. 18
The Court is saying essentially that if Nielson had tried to base his patent on
having discovered the effect of heating gas on promoting ignition and nothing more,
the claim would be directed to the law itself and would be patent ineligible. However,
Nielson had instead applied this law as part of a mechanical invention that was
patentable for other reasons. Thus, the idea of judging patent eligibility based on claim
elements considered in the absence of the law of nature is present in the Morse
decision. As set forth, however, by Judge Rich speaking for the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (the forerunner of the Federal Circuit), this approach creates serious
problems:
Another principle stated in Flook is that a mathematical algorithm or
formula is like a law of nature in that it is one of the basic tools of scientific
and technological work and as such must be deemed to be a familiar part of
the prior art, even when it was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered
by the applicant for patent, was novel at the time he discovered it, and was
useful. This gives to the term prior art, which is a very important term of
art in patent law, particularly in the application of § 103, an entirely new
dimension with consequences of unforeseeable magnitude.
It is one thing to say that a principle, natural cause, or formula, per se, is not
within the categories of § 101, but quite another to say it is prior art in
determining the nonobviousness of an invention predicated on it even though
the inventor discovered it.19

18
19

56 U.S. at 116.
Bergy, 596 F.2d at 965-966.
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B. Whole Claim Analysis (Chakrabarty and Diehr)
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,20 the Supreme Court held that microorganisms
engineered to express genes giving them the ability to digest oil spills were patent
eligible:
Judged in this light, respondent s microorganism plainly qualifies as
patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of
matter--a product of human ingenuity having a distinctive name, character
[and] use. The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the
invention here with that in Funk.21
Although the Court couches the decision as following Funk Bros., the cases could
not have been decided more differently. In Chakrabarty, the Court began by looking
at the claimed invention as a whole and the question of whether the genes used to
engineer the microorganisms were different from their natural counterparts never
arose. Once it was decided that the engineered bacteria were not found in nature, the
only remaining issues with respect to patent eligibility were whether they fell within
one of the classes recited in 35 U.S.C. § 101, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, and whether they had a practical utility.
The attempt to maintain consistency with the Funk Bros. decision by
distinguishing the cases based on the characteristics of the inventions is ill-advised.
The parallels are almost exact. The genes isolated in Chakrabarty are just as much
products of nature as the bacteria isolated in Funk Bros., and the recombinant bacteria
of Chakrabarty are equivalent to the inoculum of bacterial strains in Funk Bros. The
advantage of the Chakrabarty composition was that it replaced the multiple strains of
bacteria used on oil spills with a single strain, and the advantage of the Funk Bros.
composition was that it replaced multiple strains of bacteria used in treating plants
with a single inoculum. Finally, the genes used in Chakrabarty, just like the bacteria
in Funk Bros., performed the same function in the claimed invention that they
performed in nature (i.e., they generated hydrocarbon digesting enzymes in the
recombinant bacteria).
Given these similarities, it is not difficult to see what the results in the
Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. cases would have been if the approaches taken by the
Court were switched. Using the claim dissection approach of Funk Bros. in
Chakrabarty, the analysis would proceed by first concluding that each gene was
structurally and functionally the same in the recombinant bacteria as in nature.22 The
next question would be whether, not counting the contribution of the genes, the
recombinant bacteria were patentable. Here the answer would clearly be no since
the only thing that made the bacteria different from their natural counterpart was the
presence of the recombinant genes. Thus, Chakrabarty s invention would be found to
be patent ineligible using the analytic approach of Funk Bros.

447 U.S. at 303.
See id. at 309-310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 The genes performed the same function in producing enzymes after transformation as before.
20
21
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Using the whole claim analysis approach of Chakrabarty in the Funk Bros. case,
the first question would be whether the claimed inoculum had a counterpart in nature.
Since the patent had already issued at the time of the litigation and this would not
have occurred if there had been a comparable prior art inoculum known during
prosecution, and since there was no suggestion in the case of any such inoculum, it is
highly likely that the answer would be no. In addition, the inoculum constituted a
composition of matter and had a clear utility. It would therefore almost surely be found
to be patent eligible. Thus, at least with respect to patent eligibility, an opposite result
would be obtained. The prospects that the Court would find the invention patentable
also seem quite good since the prohibition on borrowing invention from the discovery
of the natural principle would no longer exist and the Court had acknowledged that
the patentee had discovered that there were strains of root-nodule bacteria which do
not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. 23
In light of these considerations, the notion that Chakrabarty follows Funk Bros.
seems strained at best. The cases use fundamentally different approaches to
evaluating patent eligibility that produce opposite results. The basic principle that
emerges from Chakrabarty is that: although a law of nature is not itself patent eligible,
a composition of matter with markedly different characteristics from that found in
nature and with the potential for significant utility is. This is true even if the
composition includes a product of nature that is structurally and functionally
unchanged when considered in isolation and even if the markedly different
characteristics are due entirely to contributions from the product of nature.
The approach taken in Chakrabarty was confirmed and clarified in Diamond v.
Diehr,24 a case in which the Supreme Court considered claims to a process for molding
rubber products. The process involved: (a) measuring the temperature inside a mold
where raw rubber was being cured; (b) feeding this information to a computer which
used a well-known mathematical formula (the Arrhenius equation) to calculate and
revise cure time; and (c) signaling by the computer to open the press at the appropriate
time. According to the Court:
[T]he respondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.
Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber.
Their process admittedly employs a well-known mathematical equation, but
they do not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only
to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process.25
As in Chakrabarty, the Court in Diehr begins its analysis by looking at the
claimed invention as a whole and asking if there is a counterpart in nature. Even
though the mathematical equation is an element in the claims, the Court does not
separate it out and look at it in isolation. It also does not go through the dissection of
claim elements that characterized the Funk Bros. and Flook cases. In fact, for the first
time, the Court expressly repudiates this approach:

See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-130.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
25 See id. at 187.
23
24
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In determining the eligibility of respondents claimed process for patent
protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole. It is
inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to
ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is particularly
true in a process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may
be patentable even though all the constituents of the combination were well
known and in common use before the combination was made. The novelty
of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.26
Finally, the Court makes it clear that patent eligibility and patentability are
separate concepts that should be analyzed individually: the question therefore of
whether a particular invention is novel is wholly apart from whether the invention
falls into a category of statutory subject matter. 27
III. RISE AND FALL OF THE PATENTABLE GENE AND GENE BASED DIAGNOSTICS
A. Establishment of the Patentability of Genes and Related Subject Matter
During the period between the Supreme Court s decision in Diehr and its 2012
Mayo decision, the Federal Circuit consistently held that DNA was a chemical
compound and treated it accordingly.28 During this period, the status of isolated genes
and nucleic acids as patent eligible subject matter was not so much established as
assumed.29
Doing so was not unreasonable. Chakrabarty and Diehr had both taken a whole
claim analysis approach to patent eligibility that, as discussed above, is likely to view
this subject matter favorably and these were the most recent major Supreme Court
decisions of relevance at the time. Moreover, Chakrabarty was the only one of the four
primary Supreme Court patent eligibility cases that dealt with recombinant
technology, i.e., the transferring of genes from one organism to another. It therefore
better matched the technology in most of the recombinant DNA cases decided by the
Federal Circuit.

See id. at 188-189.
See id. at 190 (citations omitted).
28 See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1206; (1991); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-1559
(1995); University Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 1168 (1997). This is more important than it might
appear. Chemical compounds are defined largely in terms of the structural features that affect the
way that they react with other compounds. DNA that has been cleaved from a larger sequence and
isolated can be used in ways that would otherwise not be possible and which is the result of differences
in the end groups available. As discussed in text that follows, the Supreme Court today seems to view
DNA as being more a passive repository of genetic information than an active chemical compound.
29 Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (1991); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re
Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (1995); University Cal. v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559
(1997).
26
27
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The Federal Circuit not ignore the risk of preemption 30 but dealt it with under the
written description and enablement provisions of patent law. Specifically, the Federal
Circuit held that a gene must be characterized in terms of its specific structure and
that the disclosure of sequence information for a single gene or protein is not sufficient
to support a claim to a class of genes or proteins based on similarity of function.31 By
2001 it was widely accepted that the isolation of a gene was sufficient to distinguish it
from a natural counterpart and, in that year, the USPTO published Utility Guidelines
that stated:
An isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a
naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene
is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as an article of
manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form
in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because
their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound.32
B. Supreme Court Intervention
1. Bilski v. Kappos
One of the first indications that there might be a problem with respect to the
patent eligibility of gene based diagnostic methods came from a case that, on its face,
has little to do with genes. In Bilski v. Kappos33 the Supreme Court considered claims
covering a process for hedging the risk of price changes in business transactions. The
Federal Circuit had previously heard the case and had given an opinion suggesting
that it might consider the machine-or-transformation test to be the sole basis for
assessing whether a process meets the patent eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Under this test, a claimed process is patent-eligible only if: (1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing.34 Since gene based diagnostic assays typically do not require
the use of a particular machine or apparatus or involve a transformation of one thing
into something else, the adoption of this test would invalidate many existing claims in
this area.
However, Bilski turned out to be a false alarm. The Supreme Court affirmed the
Federal Circuit s decision, but made it clear that the machine-or-transformation test

30 Preemption (i.e., the preclusion of the use of a natural law by others due to its being present in
a patent claim) has often been cited as a primary rationale for excluding laws of nature from being
patent eligible. See Katherine Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 567 (2013).
31 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1209-1210; Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1168-1170; In re Bell, 991 F.2d at 783-784;
Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566-1569.
32 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 02 (Jan. 5, 2001).
33 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
34 See id. at 3224.
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was not the sole test for determining the patent eligibility of a claimed process.35
Although the immediate threat to the patentability of gene based assays was averted,
Bilski did not specifically address the question of how patent eligibility should be
evaluated in the context of the life sciences. This would soon be resolved in a way that
most patent practitioners involved in biotechnology would not have thought possible.
2. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories and Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics
The first case in the demise of patentable gene based diagnostic methods was
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.36 The claims in Mayo
concerned a method for adjusting the dosage of thiopurine drugs based on metabolite
levels in a patient s blood. A claim typical of those under consideration read:
1.

A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a)
(b)

administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
8

*wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 red
blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently
administered to said subject and
*wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8x10 8
red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject. 37
The Court held that the above claim was not patent eligible because it was
directed to a law of nature the relationship between concentrations of certain
metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove
ineffective (or cause harm) and the other elements present in the claimed process did
not add enough to make the claim inventive. A primary factor that the Court relied on
was that the steps in the process (considered in the absence of the natural law itself)
involved only well-understood, conventional activity previously engaged in by
researchers in the field.38
Examining each step separately, the Court concluded that: (a) the administering
step did not add anything to the law of nature, because it referred to doctors who by
35 See id. at 3226-3227. The Court did not completely reject the machine-or-transformation test
and went so far as to suggest that test may provide a useful and important clue with regard to patent
eligibility. Presumably, it should still be available during as an argument during prosecution.
36 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
37 See id. at 1295.
38 See id. at 1294.
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definition were already treating patients with thiopurine drugs; (b) the two wherein
steps did not add anything because they were at most . . . a suggestion that the
physician should take those laws into account when treating his patient; and (c) the
determining step did not limit the doctors in any way, because they could determine
the level of the relevant metabolites . . . through whatever process they chose to use.
Finally, considering all the claim elements together, the Court concluded that the three
steps in combination added nothing to the law of nature that is not already present
when the steps are considered separately. 39
Overall, the Court basically followed the procedures set forth in the Funk Bros.
and Flook cases and reached the predictable conclusion that the claimed assay was
patent ineligible. Had the procedures of Chakrabarty and Diehr been used, the Court
would have immediately found that the claimed diagnostic method does not exist in
nature (nature does not administer drugs and test metabolite levels), that the method
falls into one of the classes of patentable subject matter recited in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (it
is a process) and that it has a practical utility (it tells physicians how to adjust drug
levels in a patient being treated). The next step would have been to analyze the novelty
and nonobviousness of the method without further consideration of eligibility issues.
The Mayo decision was concerned solely with method claims; there were no
holdings concerning the patent eligibility of claims to nucleic acids with sequences
corresponding to all, or a portion, of a gene. This left open the possibility of protecting
diagnostic assays indirectly by drafting claims covering compositions needed to carry
out the assays. However, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics40
the Court foreclosed this possibility as well.
Myriad had identified mutations in two human genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2) that
were correlated with a greatly increased risk of a woman developing breast cancer and
obtained patents covering DNA molecules that could be used in assays for the
mutations. Representative claims were:
1.
2.

An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide having
the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2.
An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1. 41

The Court held that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated. The fact that the claimed
DNA sequences were in vitro and in a different environment from corresponding
natural sequences was of no apparent significance. Similarly, the fact that the isolated
sequences could perform functions not possible for genes in cells was insufficient for
them to be considered something other than a product of nature. It appears that the
sole criterion that the Court relied on to conclude that the isolated DNAs and their
counterparts in nature were the same is their having a common sequence. Thus,
unlike the Federal Circuit in the cases discussed previously herein, the Supreme Court
does not appear to consider DNA to be a chemical compound but rather a passive
transmitter of information. Under this view, DNA s are the same if their sequences
are the same.
132 S. Ct. at 1297-1298.
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
41 See id. at 2113.
39
40
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One common misconception is that the Court indicated that cDNA would, in
general, be patentable even when DNA corresponding to the cDNA was patent
ineligible. What the Court actually said was:
As a result, cDNA is not a product of nature and is patent eligible under
§ 101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening
introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of
cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA. 42
Thus, cDNA is only patent eligible to the extent that it differs substantially from
a related gene, e.g., due to the elimination of introns. Short cDNA sequences, such as
probes, that do not represent sequences in which introns have been deleted and cDNA
derived from genes that lack introns, e.g., genes as generally found in bacteria, would
not be patent eligible.
The Myriad decision essentially ends the possibility of covering a gene based
diagnostic assay by claiming probes or primers required for its performance. Between
this decision and that of Mayo, there is very little left for businesses that depend on
the patenting of gene based diagnostic assays.
3. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int l
The Supreme Court position expressed in the Mayo and Myriad decisions was
further solidified in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int l.43 This case was concerned with a
patented method for mitigating settlement risk, i.e., the risk that only one party to
an agreed-upon financial exchange will satisfy its obligation. In particular, the patents
in suit claimed: (1) a method for exchanging financial obligations, (2) a computer
system configured to carry out the method for exchanging obligations, and (3) a
computer-readable medium containing program code for performing the method of
exchanging obligations.44
The Supreme Court indicated that assessing the patent eligibility of claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 involves a two-step process. First, a determination must be made as
to whether the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (e.g., an abstract
idea, fundamental law or product of nature). If so, the next step is to determine if the
claims include other elements, either individually or as an ordered combination, that
are sufficient to transform the subject matter in a way that makes it patent-eligible.45
Applying the first step of this test to the specific patent on appeal, the Court
concluded that its claims were directed to a patent-ineligible concept: the abstract idea
of an intermediated settlement. The Court stated that, like the risk hedging strategy
in Bilski, the concept of an intermediated settlement is a fundamental economic
practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and the use of a third-party
intermediary (or clearing house ) is a building block of the modern economy. 46
See id. at 2119.
134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014).
44 134 S.Ct. at 2353.
45 See id. at 2355-2357.
46 See id. at 2357.
42
43
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Turning to the second step, the Court concluded that the method claims merely
required generic computer implementation, and, as such, failed to transform the
abstract idea of an intermediated settlement into a patent-eligible invention. In this
regard, the Court stated, simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high
level of generality, to a method already well known in the art is not enough to supply
the inventive concept needed to make this transformation. 47
This is essentially the approach taken in the Funk Bros and Flook cases. The
Court uses claim dissection, muddles together concepts of patent eligibility and
obviousness, and omits contributions made by the accused natural element. For the
great majority of gene based diagnostic assays, the end result will be a finding of patent
ineligibility.
C. Subsequent Developments at the Federal Circuit
Subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions discussed above, there have been four
biotechnology cases decided by the Federal Circuit dealing with the patent eligibility
of claims in the area of recombinant DNA technology.48 All of these have resulted in a
finding that claims were patent ineligible. Representative of these cases are In re
BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test and Arisoa v. Sequenom, each of
which is discussed below.
1. In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test
After the Supreme Court s decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad, Ambry Genetics, a California company specializing in gene based diagnostic
assays for inherited and non-inherited diseases, began selling kits that included assays
for mutations in the BRCA 1 and BRCA2 genes. In response, the University of Utah
and Myriad filed suit in district court and the case was subsequently appealed to the
Federal Circuit.49
The composition claims at issue were directed to single-stranded DNA primers
with sequences corresponding to those present on the human chromosome where the
BRCA genes are located. The primers were used to amplify the genes as part of a
procedure for determining if a patient carried mutations indicative of an increased risk
of developing breast cancer. In considering the patent eligibility of the claims, the
court stated:

See id.
The cases are: In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test, 774 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir
2014); Ariosa v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.,
818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (2014). The first
three of these were directed, essentially, to diagnostic methods and the forth to cloned animals. There
was also a fifth case in the area of biotechnology, Rapid Litigation Management, Ltd. v. CellzDirect,
Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12352 (Fed Cir. 2016), in which claims were found to be patent eligible
(Slip opn. No. 2015-1570 (July 5, 2016)). However, this case was concerned with a method of
cryopreserving hepatocytes and not recombinant DNA technology or diagnostic assays.
49 In re BRCA1-, 774 F.3d 755.
47
48
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The primers before us are not distinguishable from the isolated DNA found
patent-ineligible in Myriad and are not similar to the cDNA found to be
patent-eligible. Primers necessarily contain the identical sequence of the
BRCA sequence directly opposite to the strand to which they are designed to
bind. They are structurally identical to the ends of DNA strands found in
nature.50
Beyond this, the court ruled that: (a) the fact that gene sequences were
chemically synthesized was of no consequence in distinguishing them from sequences
in nature;51 (b) the fact that short, single-stranded DNA cannot be found in the human
body is of no consequence since, in the view of the court, isolating separate strands of
DNA is no different from isolating DNA from other cellular components, 52 and (c) the
fact that primers do not participate in the coding of a sequence translated into a protein
is of no consequence since they still bound to complementary sequences which is a
function that they perform in cells.53
These rationales do not bode well for companies interested in patenting gene
based diagnostic methods. They suggest that, in order to transform a DNA strand into
something that is patent eligible, there will need to be a disruption of the natural DNA
sequence itself and, in order to distinguish primers based on function, the primers will
need to be doing something other than hybridizing to complementary sequences.
However, the structural and functional characteristics dismissed by the court are the
ones that most prominently differentiate DNA primers and probes from DNA found in
vivo and cannot generally be substantially changed without ruining their diagnostic
value.
The court s rulings on method claims are equally disturbing. Here, the court held
that the comparing of BRCA gene sequences from tissue samples with control BRCA
sequences represented an abstract idea that had the potential to severely impede
research on the BRCA genes and that the remaining claim elements were well-

50 See id. at 760. The position of the Federal Circuit is consistent with that of the Supreme Court
regarding isolated gene sequences. Structural differences relating to the excision of sequences from
a larger strand and differences in the environment in which the primers are found appear to be
regarded as insignificant.
51 See id. The court stated, [c]ontrary to Myriad s argument, it makes no difference that the
identified gene sequences are synthetically replicated. As the Supreme Court made clear, neither
naturally occurring compositions of matter, nor synthetically created compositions that are
structurally identical to the naturally occurring compositions, are patent eligible. Id. at 2117.
52 See id. The court stated:
Myriad argues that primers are in fact not naturally occurring because singlestranded DNA cannot be found in the human body. But, as the Supreme Court
made clear, separating [DNA] from its surrounding genetic material is not an act
of invention. The Supreme Court held ineligible claims directed to segments as
short as 15 nucleotides, the same length as the primer claims at issue here,
suggesting that even short strands identical to those found in nature are not patent
eligible. Id. (citations omitted).
53 See id. at 761. The court stated:
One of the primary functions of DNA s structure in nature is that complementary
nucleotide sequences bind to each other. It is this same function that is exploited
here the primer binds to its complementary nucleotide sequence. Thus, just as in
nature, primers utilize the innate ability of DNA to bind to itself. Id.
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understood, routine and conventional. 54 Since essentially all diagnostic tests
involve comparing the characteristics present in diseased or potentially diseased
individuals, with their normal counterparts, the court s decision suggests that the
issue of patent eligibility will be present in almost all patent applications claiming
such tests. Unless there are other claim elements that are new and unconventional,
which is rarely the case with diagnostic assays, the claims are likely to be found patent
ineligible.
2. Ariosa v. Sequenom
In the past, there have been instances when the Supreme Court has made
decisions that initially seemed to destroy well-established patent principles but which
were later tempered by Federal Circuit decisions. 55 To the extent that people in the
patent community may have maintained any lingering hope for something similar
after the decision discussed above, this hope was badly damaged by the Federal
Circuit s decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom.56
Sequenom had discovered that it was possible to perform prenatal, genetically
based diagnostic tests for paternally derived cell free fetal DNA ( cffDNA ) circulating
in a woman s blood. Although cffDNA was known to exist in the prior art, Sequenom
was the first company to recognize the diagnostic potential of this material and to
demonstrate that existing techniques could be successfully used to obtain clinically
useful results. The great advantage of the methodology lay in the fact that it could
replace more dangerous tests based on the analysis of placental samples.
Nevertheless, the court found that Sequenom s tests were unpatentable under the
analysis set forth in Mayo. After concluding that the DNA sequences found in
maternal blood are products of nature, the court states:
Like the patentee in Mayo, Sequenom contends that the claimed methods are
patent eligible applications of a natural phenomenon, specifically a method
for detecting paternally inherited cffDNA. Using methods like PCR to
amplify and detect cffDNA was well-understood, routine, and conventional
activity in 1997. The method at issue here amounts to a general instruction
to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques when seeking to detect
cffDNA. Because the method steps were well-understood, conventional and
routine, the method of detecting paternally inherited cffDNA is not new and
useful. The only subject matter new and useful as of the date of the

See id. at 763-764.
For example, in 2007, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the KSR v. Teleflex (127 S.Ct.
1727 (2007)) which was initially perceived by many to open the door to arbitrary and unanswerable
obviousness rejections. However, in a series of subsequent decisions, the Federal Circuit established
new principles that returned obviousness criteria to nearly the same place as before the Supreme
Court s decision.
56 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). See also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (denied rehearing en banc). More recent confirmation may be found in Genetic
Technologies., 818 F.3d 1369 .
54
55

[16:1 2016]

The Patenting of Gene Based Diagnostic Assays
in a Post Mayo and Myriad World

17

application was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma
or serum.57
The importance of techniques being routine, well-understood and conventional
are concepts that, under Chakrabarty and Diehr (and under the Federal Circuit
decisions prior to Mayo) would have been relevant to the obviousness of an invention
but not to patent eligibility. As in the Funk Bros. and Flook cases, the invention in
Ariosa is considered in a piecemeal manner and the contribution of the purported
products of nature to inventiveness is ignored.
D. PTO Guidelines
On March 4, 2014, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ( PTO ) released
guidelines for examiners in analyzing subject matter eligibility under the tests set
forth in the Mayo and Myriad Supreme Court decisions 58, which included many
examples of how the mandated test would be applied to different claims. Although the
guidelines just represent the views of the PTO and have no actual legal authority,
there are aspects to them that should be of interest to patent practitioners.
The first is that the PTO indicates that examiners do not need to provide evidence
to support patent ineligibility rejections; simply articulating the reason why the
claimed invention is not eligible is sufficient.59 This may amount to little more than
asserting that all claim elements, other than the natural product itself, are well known
in the art. Since this will be true in most cases involving claims to diagnostic
procedures, rejections in this area will be common.
On perhaps a more optimistic note, it appears that the PTO regards the labeling
of primer or probe sequences as sufficient to make them patent eligible, even if their
sequence corresponds to that of a sequence found in nature.60 If this is correct, and
that is far from certain, it would mean that applicants should be able to validly claim
a broad array of labelled probes and thereby provide a modicum of protection for many
common types of assays.61
788 F.3d at 1377.
DEP T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: 2014 INTERIM
GUIDANCE ON PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY (2014) [hereinafter 2014 INTERIM GUIDANCE];
DEP T OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE: JULY 2015 UPDATE: SUBJECT
MATTER
ELIGIBILITY
(2015)
[hereinafter
JULY
15
UPDATE],
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/2014-interim-guidancesubject-matter-eligibility-0.
59 See JULY 15 UPDATE. On page 6, under section IV entitled Requirements Of A Prima Facie
Case, the PTO states in paragraph 2:
For subject matter eligibility, the examiner s burden is met by clearly articulating
the reason(s) why the claimed invention is not eligible, for example by providing a
reasoned rationale that identifies the judicial exception recited in the claim and
why it is considered an exception, and that identifies the additional elements in the
claim (if any) and explains why they do not amount to significantly more than the
exception.
60 See 2014 INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 58, at 9.
61 There is good reason to at least question whether this is actually the case. The Supreme Court
was certainly willing to overlook structural changes associated with the isolation of a gene in Myriad
and the Federal Circuit found primers to the BRCA1 gene to be patent ineligible irrespective of the
57
58
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IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Patent Eligibility Standard as it Exists Today
The Supreme Court has provided a two-step test for patent eligibility. In the first
step, a decision is made as to whether an abstract idea, fundamental law or product of
nature is present in the claims of a patent. If this type of subject matter is found, the
next step is to determine whether the remaining claim elements are sufficient to
provide an inventive concept. 62 The term inventive suggests that the claim
elements are being compared to the prior art to determine if they are new and
nonobvious and, in fact, this seems to be the way in which the courts are proceeding.
However, the test differs from an obviousness analysis in two important respects.
First, in an obviousness analysis, all of the elements in a claim must be taken
into account in the context of the invention as a whole, whereas in the patent eligibility
test, the purported law of nature is excluded from consideration and analysis takes
place on an element by element basis. Since the relationship between gene mutations
or gene expression and disease is considered to be a law of nature, the single most
inventive aspect of most gene based diagnostic claims is thrown out before analysis for
inventiveness begins.
Second, it is not clear how, or if, any of the standard arguments used by patent
applicants to rebut an allegation of unpatentability on obviousness grounds, i.e., under
35 U.S.C. § 103, apply in the context of patent ineligibility. Findings by both the
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit consist mainly of conclusory allegations
unsupported by specific citations or evidence. Moreover, the PTO has instructed
examiners that they do not need to provide evidence to support patent ineligibility
rejections. It appears that essentially all that is needed is for an examiner to say why
he or she thinks a claim is not patent eligible. Thus, in addition to a claim being
stripped of the one element that is likely to be most critical to inventiveness, patent
applicants are left without any clear means for responding to allegations concerning
the claim elements that remain.
To see the shortcomings of the Myriad and Alice test, one need only to step back
and look at the results produced. Clinical procedures have become indistinguishable
from products of nature for the purposes of patent eligibility, leaving one with the sense
that they have not been through a legal analysis so much as an exercise in making
inventions disappear. Yes, the relationships relied on exist in nature. But these are
diagnostic tests ordered by physicians and performed on samples taken from patients,
with analyses made on machines and results compared to controls! How can they
possibly be products of nature?
If, in Mayo and Myriad, the Supreme Court had followed the approach taken in
Chakrabarty and Diehr and asked whether a claimed invention (considered as a whole
and taking into account the contribution of all elements) is found in nature, then the
fact that the DNAs could be used solely for binding to DNA sequences to prime PCR reactions and
could no longer encode a natural protein. The PTO guidelines were published before In re BRCA1- &
BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test was decided but the PTO did not revise their statements in the
update published in July of 2015.
62 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294; Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
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absurdity of concluding that diagnostic assays are essentially a part of nature could
have been avoided. Concerns about preemption are not new and could have been
addressed by the written description and enablement sections of the law. In addition,
safe harbors have been created and could be expanded if necessary.63
So why didn t the Supreme Court do this? After all, the Chakrabarty and Diehr
decisions were more recent than Flook and much more recent than Funk Bros. In
addition, there had been thirty years of the de facto following of Chakrabarty and Diehr
by the Federal Circuit and an entire industry that had developed under these
decisions.
One possibility is that the Court may not have fully appreciated the repercussions
of the decisions. In the Myriad decision, Justice Thomas seemed, at one point, to
indicate that the Court s decision may have been different if the case had involved
method claims:
Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of
knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted
that, [a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2]
sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that
knowledge.
Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to such
applications. 64
This suggests that, perhaps, the Court wanted to leave open the possibility of
diagnostic claims based on genes being patentable even if the genes themselves are
not. Of course, the Court had already expressed an unfavorable view of diagnostic
tests in the Mayo case and it would soon confirm the patent eligibility test of Myriad
in Alice.
Another possibility is that the Court understood that it was destroying thousands
of patent claims and the underpinnings of many diagnostic biotechnology companies,
but simply thought that effectively reducing the cost of diagnostic tests to patients and
ensuring that everyone would be free to practice and develop tests was more important.
If this is the case, then it is basically a repudiation of the patent system (at least insofar
as it applies to diagnostic medicine). Under these circumstances, companies would be
well advised to invest their time and talent elsewhere.
B. The Future of Gene Based Diagnostic Tests
There are, of course, those that do not view the effect of the recent patent
eligibility decisions on gene based diagnostic assays as being destructive at all. The
result that they see from the Mayo and Myriad decisions is a greater availability of
diagnostic tests at much lower prices and unimpeded further development of assays
by whoever chooses to do so. Perhaps these people envision a system in which
exploratory research is essentially the exclusive domain of public sector institutions
and private industry, to the degree that it participates at all, implements and markets

63
64

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Merck v. Integra, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
133 S. Ct. at 2120.
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tests on a non-proprietary basis. The extent to which this is likely, or even sensible,
may be debated.
What is clear, however, is that the biotechnology industry has developed and
thrived in an atmosphere in which companies were able to develop patentable
inventions and this has now been severely compromised in at least one important area.
The decisions in Mayo and Myriad are more than simply findings that claims to a test
for adjusting drug levels and a test for cancer susceptibility are invalid. They are,
essentially, the end of gene based assays as patentable subject matter. If the Supreme
Court did not intend this, then they need to rectify matters as soon as possible. If it
was deliberate, then they need to reconsider the wisdom and justice of their rulings.
A place to start would be with the comments made by Justice Moore when the Myriad
case was at the Federal Circuit:
The Patent Office has, for more than a decade, affirmatively stated its belief
that isolated DNA is patentable for the same reasons as isolated vitamins or
hormones. There is no indication from Congress that this view is wrong; to
the contrary, it appears Congress also believes DNA is patentable. This longterm policy of protecting isolated DNA molecules has resulted in an explosion
of innovation in the biotechnology industry, an industry which, unlike the
financial services industry or even the software industry, depends on patents
to survive. Holding isolated DNA not patentable would destroy long settled
industry expectations for no reason other than a gut feeling that DNA is too
close to nature to be patentable, an arbitrary decision based on a judge-made
exception.
We cannot, after decades of patents and judicial precedent, now call human
DNA fruit from the poisonous tree, and punish those inquisitive enough to
investigate, isolate, and patent it . . . The patents in this case might well
deserve to be excluded from the patent system, but that is a debate for
Congress to resolve. I will not strip an entire industry of the property rights
it has invested in, earned, and owned for decades unchallenged under the
facts of this case.65
Assuming that the patent eligibility standards of the Supreme Court remain as
they are, we will not return to a system of trade guilds and secret knowledge in the
area of diagnostic tests. That is not possible in a world of regulated products and
lawsuits. What is likely to occur will hardly be noticed; companies will simply not
invest in these areas in the U.S. in the future. The tests that never became available
will not be missed and patients will never know what their prognosis might have been
if only their disease had been detected sooner.

65 Ass n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).

